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Objectivity and Perfection in 
Hume’s Hedonism
D a l e  D O r s e y *
abstract In this paper, I investigate David Hume’s theory of well-being or pru-
dential value. That Hume was some sort of hedonist is typically taken for granted in 
discussions of his value theory, but I argue that Hume was a hedonist of pathbreaking 
sophistication. His hedonism intriguingly blends traditional hedonism with a form of 
perfectionism yielding a version of qualitative hedonism that not only solves puzzles 
surrounding Hume’s moral theory, but is interesting and important in its own right.
keywords Hume, hedonism, perfectionism, well-being, prudential value
david hume’s value theory—in particular, his theory of prudential value or 
self-interest—is rarely investigated in any depth. Though he makes a number of 
claims about particular objects or states that are in people’s interest (including 
his discussion of the prudential value of the virtues in the second Enquiry; see E 
9.14–25),1 few have attempted a clear statement of Hume’s theory of happiness, 
welfare, or self-interest, much less investigated whether and why Hume’s various 
claims about the prudential value of virtue or any other qualities might or might 
not follow from them.
In this essay, I investigate Hume’s account of the nature of self-interest (or, 
interchangeably, “happiness,” “welfare,” etc.). In essence, my reading is this: 
Hume was a hedonist. He believed that pleasure and pain are the only things that 
influence the prudential value of a life. But Hume was a hedonist of extraordinary 
sophistication. His hedonism intriguingly blends traditional hedonism with 
a perfectionist value theory leaving a version of qualitative hedonism with—in 
something of a coup for qualitative hedonists—a clear and compelling rationale 
for the relative value of higher and lower pleasures.
My reading of Hume’s view proceeds by a series of questions, each of which 
arises as a natural extension of a prior step in my investigation. after having 
* Dale Dorsey is associate Professor of Philosophy and Meredith J. Docking Faculty scholar 
at the University of Kansas.
1 references to the Enquiry will be made in the text (as E), noting the paragraph and sBN pagi-
nation.
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defended the claim that Hume is a hedonist about welfare or well-being in §1, 
I ask (in §2) a simple “meta-evaluative” question that arises for any version of 
hedonism: what, for Hume, is the source or ground of pleasure’s goodness? Is it the 
case that pleasure is good because pleasure is desired, or wanted, or is otherwise the 
subject of an authoritative pro-attitude (call this “subjective hedonism”)? Or is it 
the case that pleasure is good independently of such attitudes (call this “objective 
hedonism”)? I hold that, contrary to some suggestive textual remarks, Hume is 
an objective, rather than subjective, hedonist. However, an objective response to 
this meta-evaluative question gives rise to further first-order questions, in particular, 
how one might rank-order various pleasurable experiences if the source of their 
comparative value is not strictly subjective (and hence purely psychological). 
I discuss this question in §3: I hold that Hume accepts a sophisticated version 
of qualitative hedonism according to which the comparative value of particular 
pleasures is not simply determined by their intensity and duration. But this claim 
gives rise to a further explanatory question: what, for Hume, explains the value of the 
“higher” as opposed to “lower” pleasures? I discuss this in §4. I claim that Hume 
accepts a unique hybrid of hedonism and perfectionism: a view that indexes the 
value of individual pleasures to the extent to which these pleasures conform to, 
or are fitting of, a particularly sentimentalist conception of human nature. In §5, 
I argue that the method by which I answer the above questions sheds substantial 
light on a classically puzzling passage in Hume’s corpus, namely, his discussion 
of the sensible knave. §6 concludes. 
1 .  h e d o n i s m ,  g o o d ,  a n d  p r u d e n t i a l  v a l u e
That Hume is some sort of hedonist is not particularly revelatory. Consider: “Nature 
has implanted in the human mind a perception of good or evil, or in other words, 
of pain and pleasure, as the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions,” (T 
1.3.10.2).2 In explaining the sources of the direct passions, Hume writes, “Beside 
good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently 
arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable” (T 
2.3.9.8, 439).3 Not only does he characterize pain and pleasure as the “chief” 
2 Typically when quoting the Treatise and Enquiry, I will list the citation in the text by paragraph, 
and sBN pagination. Notably, however, this citation differs as there is no sBN pagination!  This passage, 
drawn from the critical (Norton and Norton) edition, differs from the selby-Bigge text. The selby-
Bigge text reads, instead: “There is implanted in the human mind a perception of pain and pleasure, 
as the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions.” as Norton and Norton point out, however, 
the selby-Bigge text is based on a set of cancellations Hume adopted while vol. 2 of the Treatise was 
being printed, for the purposes of accommodating an expanded footnote detailing his use of the term 
‘imagination.’ Norton and Norton make use of the earlier, unamended text. In any event, it is clear 
that Hume believes that good and evil and pain and pleasure are conceptually identical, insofar as this 
point comes up again, unamended, in T 2.3.9.8, 439 and throughout T 2.3.9, 438–48.
3 Hume here distinguishes the direct passions from pleasure and pain. an anonymous reviewer 
wonders whether this means that the direct passions (fear, hope, joy, etc.) are not intrinsically valu-
able for Hume. and while it is clear that Hume believes that (at least some of) the direct passions are 
a result of consideration of the possibility of pain or pleasure or the expectation of some good or evil 
(fear, for instance, is produced by the uncertainty of evil [T 2.3.9.6, 439]), this does not answer the 
question of whether the direct passions themselves are, in fact, instances of pain or pleasure and are 
hence themselves good or evil. I do not take a stand on this issue, except to say that there is no barrier 
to Hume’s acceptance that such passions are instances of pleasure and pain (especially insofar as some 
pleasurable sentiments take intentional or propositional objects; see §2.2).
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motivator of humankind, he appears to claim, in so doing, that the connection 
between pain and pleasure and good and evil is extremely tight. Good and evil 
just are pain and pleasure, “in other words.”
Thus Hume clearly treats pleasure and pain as good and evil. But this does 
not guarantee any particular reading of his theory of welfare or prudential value. 
His hedonism could, in principle, be a conception of many different concepts. 
For instance, one could be a hedonist about moral goodness (i.e. morality requires 
individuals to promote pleasure for some specified group—call this “moral 
hedonism”); a hedonist about the good simpliciter or impersonal good (call this 
“axiological hedonism”); or a hedonist about well-being or the personal good (call 
this “welfare hedonism”).4 It would appear that the passages above indicate only 
a form of axiological hedonism: pleasure is good; pain is evil. Does Hume, then, 
also accept a form of welfare hedonism? 
Were he to do so, he would certainly not be alone among his (broadly speaking) 
contemporaries. shaftesbury, for instance, claims that pleasure constitutes self-
interest.5 Hutcheson also appears to squarely identify pleasure with self-interest 
or the prudential good:
Because we shall afterwards frequently use the Words Interest, advantage, natural 
Good, it is necessary here to fix their Ideas. The Pleasure in our sensible Perceptions 
of any kind, gives us our first Idea of natural Good, or Happiness; and then all 
Objects which are apt to excite this Pleasure are call’d immediately Good.  .  .  .  Our 
perception of Pleasure is necessary, and nothing is advantageous or naturally Good 
to us, but what is apt to raise Pleasure mediately, or immediately.6
like Hutcheson and shaftesbury, I think we should read Hume as a hedonist about 
welfare or well-being rather than strictly a hedonist about the good simpliciter. First, 
Hume clearly possesses the relevant concept. Hume often speaks of “self-interest” 
(as Hutcheson discusses “Interest, advantage, natural Good”), for example, when 
he discusses the “interested obligation” to virtue in book nine of the second Enquiry. 
There, Hume writes, “Having explained the moral approbation attending merit or 
virtue, there remains nothing, but briefly to consider our interested obligation to 
it, and to enquire, whether every man, who has any regard to his own happiness 
and welfare, will not best find his account in the practice of every moral duty” 
(E 9.14, 278). Here Hume makes explicit use of the concepts of happiness and 
welfare. (Indeed, he seems to treat these concepts as referring to the same broad 
idea—self-interest.) Given that Hume treats good and evil as pleasure and pain 
“in other words,” it would be strange for him not to hold that hedonism, in some 
form or other, is also the proper concept of specifically prudential value or the 
personal good.
second, in the first appendix of the second Enquiry, Hume writes,
Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of reason and of taste are easily ascertained. 
The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood: The latter gives the 
4 For a more in-depth discussion of the variety of concepts of which hedonism is a conception, 
see Kagan, Normative Ethics, 30–31.
5 see, for instance, shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 57–59.
6 Hutcheson, Inquiry, 86. 
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sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. . . . reason, being cool and 
disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse received from 
appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of attaining happiness or avoiding 
misery. Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, 
becomes a motive to action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition. 
(E app. 1, 21, 294.) 
This passage is, or so I claim, central for an understanding of Hume’s theory of 
welfare, and I shall have occasion to return to it in due course. But as regards 
the point at issue: according to Hume, “happiness or misery” is constituted by 
the faculty of taste, not reason (though reason will show us the proper means by 
which to develop our happiness). But the explanation of this refers explicitly to 
the fact that taste “gives pleasure or pain.” as it gives pleasure and pain, it thereby 
constitutes happiness or misery. Thus it would appear that the extent to which any 
particular faculty or group of sentiments constitutes, or contributes to, happiness 
or misery is determined by the extent to which this faculty or group of sentiments 
“gives pleasure or pain.” and hence there is good reason to believe that Hume is 
some sort of hedonist about self-interest even if he is also an axiological hedonist 
(which, it seems, he clearly is). 
2 .  w h a t  g r o u n d s  p l e a s u r e ’ s  v a l u e ?
To better understand the nature of Hume’s value theory, however, it is worthwhile 
to ask a question that arises for any hedonist axiology (whether a version of welfare 
hedonism or not). This question is “meta-evaluative”; it is not a question about 
what is valuable, but rather about how intrinsic values come to have that status. For 
a hedonist, the question runs as follows: what grounds the value of pleasure? In 
other words, what explains the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain and, just 
as importantly, the lack of intrinsic value of other, non-pleasure, goods? Broadly 
speaking, there are two potential answers to this question. First, one might be a 
subjective hedonist. On this view, pleasure’s goodness is explained by the fact that it 
is the object of value-imparting pro-attitudes or sentiments. Classically, subjective 
hedonism claims that intrinsic prudential values are the objects of value-conferring 
or authoritative desires or pro-attitudes and that humankind is in agreement 
concerning the ultimate object (pleasure) of such value-authoritative attitudes. 
second, one might be an objective hedonist. Objective hedonism holds that pleasure 
is good, or constitutes well-being, independently of any pro-attitude possessed by 
observers or evaluators. Pleasure just is the good and does not permit of any further 
grounding.7 P. J. e. Kail refers to the subjective version of hedonism as the “desire-
constituting” (subjective) model, according to which “something acquires the status 
of good from being desired, such that, on the most basic model, anything that is 
desired is good, and is good because it is desired.”8 On an objective hedonism, by 
contrast, the goodness of pleasure is independent of its being desired. 
7 For more on this distinction, see Dorsey, “Dilemma.”
8 Kail, Realism, 185. Classic versions of subjective hedonism are found in sidgwick, Methods; and 
Gosling, Pleasure. (Gosling rejects this account of the grounding of pleasure’s value, but nevertheless 
holds that it is a substantive and plausible proposal.)
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2.1. A Case for the Subjective Reading 
some passages in Hume suggest a subjective reading. First, Hume seems to hold 
that moral virtue is a product of value-authoritative pro-attitudes: “To have the 
sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the 
contemplation of a character. This very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. 
We go no farther” (T 3.1.2.3, 471). and if Hume believes that virtue is itself a 
function of our attitudes of approval or disapproval, praise or admiration, then 
it would appear strange to treat his axiological theory asymetrically. Why should 
moral value be dependent on the sentiments of humans, but welfare or prudential 
value be independent? This is especially the case if, as some read Hume, evaluative 
judgments are taken just to be expressions of affective or conative states.9 For it 
would seem quite false to say that moral judgments are the expression of such states 
of approval or disapproval and that judgments about the good can nevertheless 
be understood as true or false in a way that is grounded independently of any 
attitude of approval or disapproval—which, of course, just is the objective view.
In addition, Hume appears to consistently deny that anything could have value 
in and of itself apart from the operation of human sentiment.10 Hume writes, “If 
we can depend upon any principle, which we learn from philosophy, this, I think, 
may be considered as certain and undoubted, that there is nothing, in itself, 
valuable or despicable, desirable or hateful, beautiful or deformed; but that these 
attributes arise from the particular constitution and fabric of human sentiment and 
affection.”11 Here it would appear that the ultimate standard of value must be “the 
particular constitution and fabric of human sentiment and affection.” and if this is 
correct, to say that pleasure is valuable, or “good” (as Hume does consistently) one 
must say that pleasure itself is recommended by human sentiment and affection: 
pleasure’s value must be grounded by some authoritative pro-attitude directed 
toward pleasure and away from pain. 
9 see Penelhum, Hume, 141.
10 Hume appears to make this claim explicitly when concerned with the origin of virtue and vice; 
see T 3.1.1.26, 469.
11 Hume, “The sceptic,” 162. an anonymous reviewer for this journal notes that “The sceptic” 
is a somewhat unusual piece of writing in Hume’s corpus, and does not permit of a straightforward 
reading, given its relation to three preceding essays on happiness, viz. “The epicurean,” “The stoic,” 
and “The Platonist.” This is quite right. However, despite its unusual placement, there is good reason 
to believe that “The sceptic” represents Hume’s considered views. see, for instance, Fogelin, Skepticism; 
stewart, “legacy”; Harris, “Four essays.” and while there is some dissent from this treatment of “The 
sceptic” (see, notably, Immerwahr, “Happiness”), there is good reason to hold that the more popular 
position is the right one. as noted by Heydt (“relations”), “The sceptic” represents the alleviation 
of tension between the three views represented by its predecessor essays: in arguing that philosophy 
itself cannot pick out a single path of happiness, Hume undermines “the pretensions of the three 
authors [the epicurean, stoic, and Platonist] to be presenting the nature of human happiness, thereby 
promoting eclecticism and moderation” (“relations,” 13). However, even if we remain agnostic about 
the relation between “The sceptic” as a whole and Hume’s considered views as a whole, the central 
passages I cite from “The sceptic” are well represented in other texts. For instance, in E app. 1.21, 
294, Hume echoes “The sceptic” in claiming that it is merely the operation of the faculty of taste that 
renders objects beautiful or despicable, which is also noted in “Of the standard of Taste” (see §3.1 
below). Furthermore, his discussion of the prudential value of virtue—to which I make reference in 
§3.2—mirrors almost identically Hume’s own discussion of the sensible knave, to be found in book 
9 of the second Enquiry. and hence there is good reason to believe that “The sceptic,” or at least the 
passages to which I make reference here, represents Hume’s considered views.
250 journal  of  the  h istory  o f  phi lo so phy  53 :2  Apr i l  2015
2.2. Against the Subjective Reading 
Before turning to my argument against a subjective reading of Hume’s hedonism, 
I should briefly consider what I take to be an inconclusive argument against the 
subjective reading, offered by Kail. Kail argues that one ought to reject a subjective 
reading because a subjective reading cannot explain the “convergence on the thesis 
[that] pleasure and pain are essential values.”12 By ‘convergence,’ Kail means the 
“convergence in judgement regarding what is desirable and aversion-worthy for its 
own sake.”13 Objective hedonism, according to Kail, “can explain the convergence 
by appealing to the very character of experiences. The agreement is commanded 
because we are acquainted with states of mind that are essentially valuable.”14 In 
being acquainted with states of mind that are (objectively) valuable, we converge 
on desires for such states and (if this is different) our judgment that such states 
are valuable. at first glance, however, it seems wrong to say that only objective 
hedonism can explain this convergence. after all, a subjectivist hedonism offers 
a perfectly good explanation: the convergence is explained by psychological fact, 
namely, the fact that pleasure is alone the object of our judgments of value and 
(if this is different) the relevantly authoritative pro-attitudes. according to Kail, 
however, this explanation is unacceptable: “Prima facie people desire things other 
than pleasure for their own sakes, so there is nothing in the desire-constitution 
model itself which forces us to the conclusion that pleasure is the only good.”15
Of course, we might agree with Kail. It may very well be implausible to believe 
that all individuals restrict the objects of their pro-attitudes to pleasure. But Hume 
himself—at least on a subjective reading—appears to have the resources to avoid 
Kail’s complaint. Note that any subjective hedonism must deal with the fact that, 
of course, we approve of many non-pleasure things (including moral virtue, nice 
walks on the beach, satisfying cold drinks, the welfare of our children, etc.). The 
typical response—for virtually any kind of subjectivism, hedonist or not16—is to 
suggest that only a subset of pro-attitudes have import for intrinsic value or welfare 
in particular. (For instance, most subjective hedonists will say that our desires for, 
e.g. cold drinks are derivative—derivative of a more fundamental desire for the 
pleasure that such cold drinks bring.) Hume appears to have the resources to make 
just this sort of distinction. Not only does Hume distinguish between fundamental 
and derivative desires (see E app. 1, 18–19, 293), Hume accepts that sentiments 
differ in kind when it comes to the concepts of which they grant approval. (see 
T 3.1.2.4, 472, and my discussion of this passage below.) and hence it seems at 
least possible to say that, for Hume, the relevant sentiments that grant welfare value 
to particular pleasures are different in kind from those that grant moral value to 
particular character traits or gustatory value to wines, and so forth, and hence 
need not impart intrinsic welfare value on equal terms.17
12 Kail, Realism, 184.
13 Kail, Realism, 184.
14 Kail, Realism, 185.
15 Kail, Realism, 185.
16 see, for instance, sidgwick, Methods, 111; railton, “Facts and Values,” 54–55.
17 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point.
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Hence it seems to me that Kail’s argument is inconclusive. Though people 
very clearly desire things other than pleasure, Hume has the resources to restrict 
the range of welfare-authoritative sentiments in a manner that may successfully 
exclude all but pleasure in the realm of intrinsic goods and evils. Merely because 
individuals desire, say, good bottles of wine, or moral virtue in addition to their 
convergence on a desire for pleasure, such desires need not be authoritative for 
prudential value in particular, and hence a subjectivist reading of Hume has the 
resources to avoid Kail’s central attack on subjective hedonism.
However, I think Kail is on the right track.18 Hume is not a subjective hedonist. 
I offer two arguments here, the first somewhat less decisive, the other more so. 
The first argument relies on a consideration of an important feature of Hume’s 
conception of the nature of pleasure. In T 3.1.2.4, 472, Hume writes, 
For, first, ’tis evident, that under the term pleasure, we comprehend sensations, 
which are very different from each other, and which have only such a distant 
resemblance, as is requisite to make them be express’d by the same abstract term. 
a good composition of music and a bottle of good wine equally produce pleasure; 
and what is more, their goodness is determin’d merely by the pleasure. But shall we 
say upon that account, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of a good flavour? 
In like manner an inanimate object, and the character or sentiments of any person 
may, both of them, give satisfaction; but as the satisfaction is different, this keeps our 
sentiments concerning them from being confounded, and makes us ascribe virtue 
to the one, and not to the other. Nor is every sentiment of pleasure or pain, which 
arises from characters and actions, of that peculiar kind, which makes us praise or 
condemn. The good qualities of an enemy are hurtful to us; but may still command 
our esteem and respect. 
a proper treatment of Hume’s precise conception of pleasure would take us well 
afield. Nevertheless, one feature of this conception is reflected in the above passage 
and worth noting in the present context. Most importantly, Hume appears to assert 
that pleasures are extraordinarily diverse in kind: the pleasure that we take in wine 
is different than the pleasure we take in music; the pleasure we take in an honorable 
enemy is different than the pleasure we take in an honorable friend. But this view 
is in tension with (though admittedly is not straightforwardly inconsistent with) a 
subjective approach to Hume’s hedonism: if pleasures are of such variable kinds, 
18 I should note at this point one slight difference between our readings of Hume on the status 
of pleasure’s value. according to Kail, the proper contrast on the question of the “status of good” is 
between the desire-constituting model and the “desire-determining” model. On the latter view, “the 
relation between desire and value is the other way around [in comparison to the desire-constituting 
model]. It is because the relevant feature is valuable that edmund desires it. . . . Value and desire are 
‘internally connected’ in so far as a suitably-equipped, suitably positioned agent must, on cognition of 
that value be appropriately conatively disposed” (Kail, Realism, 185). and while the desire-determining 
view implies objective hedonism (i.e. the value of pleasure is not explained by its status qua object of 
pro-attitude), the desire-determining view as Kail describes it is stronger than a commitment to objec-
tive hedonism; it commits not only to the explanatory independence of pleasure’s value from desire, 
but to an “internal connection” between value and desire. Whether this connection holds depends, 
in my view, on the proper reading of “suitably-equipped.” as I shall argue below, the only agents that 
have a consistent desire for more valuable, rather than less valuable, pleasures are those possessed of 
the true standard of taste. For our purposes here, however, it is sufficient to note that Kail accepts the 
claim that, for Hume, “[p]leasure and pain are, of their very essence, desirable and awful ‘of them-
selves.’” This claim is objective hedonism as I understand it, and on reading Hume as accepting this 
view, Kail and I are in agreement.
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a subjective reading appears to face a very high bar in showing that each diverse 
sensation referred to by ‘pleasure’ is equally approved of by all. This problem 
differs from, and is much more serious than, Kail’s challenge. Because Hume 
believes that pleasures are extremely diverse, the problem is not in showing that 
nothing else is desired or valued, but rather in showing that pro-attitudes are taken 
to all pleasure, regardless of the diverse elements in the extension of this “abstract 
term.” But, crucially, this cannot be shown by Hume or any subjective hedonist by 
restricting the range of value-authoritative sentiments.
However, the most decisive challenge for the subjective reading is that, for 
Hume, the identification of goodness with pleasure and evil with pain is a matter—
or so it would seem—of concept. For Hume, pain and pleasure are simply good and 
evil “in other words” (T 1.3.10.2; T 2.3.9.8, 439). Indeed, throughout Hume’s 
discussion of the direct passions, he treats these terms as interchangeable (T 2.3.9, 
438–48). But it would appear odd for Hume to identify pleasure and pain and good 
and evil in this way if he believed that the value of pain and pleasure depended upon 
an empirical psychological fact, namely, that the sentiments of humanity generally 
evaluate pleasure positively. In discussing the value of individual character traits, 
for instance, Hume provides lengthy psychological explanations for the fact that we 
find particular traits useful or agreeable. (see, especially, the fifth through seventh 
books of the second Enquiry.) But he appears to claim that the source of pleasure’s 
value is just a matter of the terms in question and offers no further psychological 
explanation. For this reason, we should be wary of the subjective reading: Hume 
nowhere allows that the value of the hedonic states, that is, their goodness or evil, 
is dependent upon human psychology. But this is precisely what he should say if he 
accepts the subjective reading. Instead, for Hume, pleasure simply is good; pain 
is evil “in other words.” There is no further ground.19 
2.3. Objection: Asymmetry 
Only an objective reading can account for Hume’s failure to vindicate the value of 
pleasure via psychological explanation. But it is too early to close the book. Two 
important objections to an objective reading arise.
First, if we reject a subjective reading of the value of pleasure, we must read 
Hume as holding that the ground of value is asymmetric: pleasure, for Hume, just 
is good in a way that is independent of psychological fact. The value of particular 
characters, bottles of wine, symphonies, however, must be grounded by our 
sentimental reactions and is not valuable independent of same. This may, in itself, 
constitute an objection to my proposal. Why should pleasure be special? 
19 One potential response to these arguments is to suggest that Hume held a desiderative theory 
of pleasure, a theory according to which all and only mental experiences that are desired, or to which 
one takes a pro-attitude, qualify as pleasure. (see, for instance, Parfit, Reasons, app. I.) One could accept 
the claim that the ground of pleasure’s value is that it is desired, but still hold that pain and pleasure 
are conceptually linked to value, insofar as pleasure is conceptually linked to desire. But notice that 
Hume seems to explicitly reject this view. according to Hume, at least some pleasures are “fundamental 
impressions”; see T 1.4.2.12, 192.
253objectiv ity  &  perfecti o n  i n  hu me’s  hed o n i sm
The purported asymmetry, however, is not unusual among sentimentalist 
writers. Compare, for instance, the following passages from Hutcheson.20 Opening 
the Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, Hutcheson writes, “Objects, 
actions, or events obtain the Name of Good, or Evil, according as they are the 
Causes, or Occasions, mediately, or immediately, of a grateful, or ungrateful 
Perception to some sensitive Nature.”21 This passage is reminiscent of Hume’s own 
declaration that “there is nothing, in itself, valuable or despicable, desirable or 
hateful, beautiful or deformed; but that these attributes arise from the particular 
constitution and fabric of human sentiment and affection.” But for Hutcheson, 
the “grateful, or ungrateful Perception” is intended to be a product of the “several 
Senses natural to us,”22 which are identified as “Determination[s] of our Minds to receive 
Ideas independently on our Will, and to have Perceptions of Pleasure and Pain.”23 Thus the 
“grateful” perception given rise to by good objects appears, simply, to be pleasure 
itself: good “Objects, actions, or events” are good insofar as they are productive 
of the pleasure of one of our sensitive capacities. Hutcheson confirms this: 
The following Definitions of certain Words used on this subject, may shorten our 
expressions; and the Axioms subjoined may shew the manner of acting from calm 
Desire, with the analogy to the Laws of Motion.
1. Natural Good is Pleasure: Natural Evil is Pain.
2. Natural good Objects are those which are apt, either mediately or immediately to 
give Pleasure; the former are called Advantageous. Natural Evil Objects are such as, in 
like manner, give pain.24 
Hutcheson adopts very different evaluative stances with regard to the “natural 
good” (characterized by pleasure and pain) and good objects (such as actions 
or events). The goodness of the latter class is a product of our sentiments (in 
particular, the pleasurable ones). But the goodness of the former is not grounded by 
sentiment or a product of “sensitive nature.” For Hutcheson, it just is the case that 
pleasure is good and pain is bad. Hutcheson’s hedonism, therefore, is objective. 
Hume should be read as saying precisely the same thing. Notice, however, that 
there is no incoherence or implausibility in adopting the asymmetry so described. 
Ultimately, the value that Hume imparts to morally valuable characters or good 
bottles of wine is derivative: it is derived from its capacity to cause fundamentally 
valuable sensations and sentiments in observers or experiencers. Indeed, in 
“The sceptic,” Hume says precisely this: “even when the mind operates alone, 
and feeling the sentiment of blame or approbation, pronounces one object 
deformed or odious, another beautiful and amiable; I say that, even in this case, 
those qualities are not really in the objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment 
20 Of course, the similarity between Hutcheson and Hume in general philosophical orientation 
is extraordinarily controversial. I bring up Hutcheson’s view here simply for the sake of showing that 
just such an asymmetry is not unprecedented.
21 Hutcheson, Essay, 15.
22 Hutcheson, Essay, 15.
23 Hutcheson, Essay, 17.
24 Hutcheson, Essay, 34; see also Kail, Realism, 178.
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of that mind which blames or praises.”25 Thus Hume appears to admit that there 
is a substantial asymmetry between the value of good objects and the value of “the 
sentiment of that mind which blames or praises” such objects: the value of the 
former are simply derivative of the value of the latter. and hence it should be no 
surprise that the source or ground of the value of pleasure, and the value of only 
derivatively good objects, diverge. 
2.4. Objection: Textual Incoherence
Places in Hume’s text suggest an objective reading. But to conclude that he is an 
objective hedonist on this basis is to ignore a range of passages that suggest the 
opposite. Most importantly, recall that Hume holds that “there is nothing, in itself, 
valuable or despicable, desirable or hateful, beautiful or deformed; but that these 
attributes arise from the particular constitution and fabric of human sentiment 
and affection.” This might be thought to cause problems for an objective reading, 
insofar as Hume does not just say “no objects” are valuable in and of themselves, 
but rather nothing. For Hume, nothing is valuable in and of itself without its value 
being grounded by value-conferring pro-attitude or sentiment.
We misread this passage if we take Hume’s claim as a rejection of objective 
hedonism, however. as is clear from the context of the essay in which it appears, 
he intends simply to examine the value of good “objects,” rather than—to use 
a Hutchesonian phrase—the natural good of pleasure. Note that the topic of 
“The sceptic” is the “methods of obtaining happiness.”26 In other words, Hume 
is seeking to provide prudential advice. To this end, Hume is most interested in 
considering different “pursuits among our species,”27 or courses of life for their 
relative merits. Hence from the context of “The sceptic,” we should read ‘nothing’ 
as ranging over only objects, pursuits, actions, activities, and so forth, that is, the 
sort of thing you might pursue with an eye toward pleasure or happiness. This is 
clear from the passage immediately following: “What seems the most delicious 
food to one animal, appears loathsome to another: What affects the feeling of one 
with delight, produces uneasiness in another.”28 In essence, Hume is saying this: 
there are no objects, pursuits, manners of existence, and so on, that are valuable 
independently of a feeling of pleasure. There are no facts about such pursuits that 
would render them valuable other than that they cause pleasure. Certain sorts of 
food please some animals, not others; some people take pleasure in bawdy college 
comedies, others enjoy brooding scandinavian dramas. This claim, however, says 
very little about the nature of the value of pleasure itself, or how pleasure gets its 
evaluative stripes. Thus, it seems to me, in weighing the textual evidence, Hume 
is best read as holding an objective, not subjective, account of the ground of the 
value of pleasure and disvalue of pain. 
25 Hume, “The sceptic,” 163.
26 Hume, “The sceptic,” 160.
27 Hume, “The sceptic,” 160.
28 Hume, “The sceptic,” 160.
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2.5. A New Question 
To read Hume as an objective hedonist is to uncover a new and interesting 
question about his value theory. This question concerns its first-order structure. 
any value theory ought to provide at least a rubric to determine what intrinsic 
values are more valuable than others. Were Hume’s hedonism subjective, however, 
this question would simply be answered by conducting a socio-psychological 
inquiry. To figure out the rank-ordering of particular pleasures (say, the pleasure 
of reading Buchan’s Greenmantle  versus the pleasure of listening to aurora Nealand 
and the royal roses), we simply figure out the extent to which those pleasures are 
valued or desired perhaps by some subset of value-authoritative individuals. But if 
Hume’s account is objective, determining the relative value of pleasures is not a 
strictly psychological, but rather a philosophical, or evaluative, task. Given Hume’s 
objective hedonism, it seems sensible to ask what his position is with respect to the 
relative value of individual pleasurable experiences.
There are two contrary proposals I explore here. One holds that pleasures are 
ordered simply by their pleasurableness: the more pleasure, the better. This is a 
quantitative hedonism. But hedonists can consistently deny that pleasures should 
be ordered simply on a quantitative basis.29 One might hold that the relative 
value of individual pleasures is in part dependent upon additional properties, 
that is, properties of a pleasurable experience that do not simply reduce to its 
pleasurableness. This is a qualitative hedonism: different pleasures are of differing 
quality in a way that is distinct from their differing pleasurableness. What is Hume’s 
view? 
3 .  h u m e  a s  q u a l i t a t i v e  h e d o n i s t
It seems fair to say that the default hedonist position is that pleasures are to be 
rank-ordered according to their intensity and duration, that is, by their pleasurableness. 
after all, if one values pleasure, or believes that pleasure is the good, it is natural 
to say that more pleasure is better than less.
and though this position is natural, it is by no means universal or conceptually 
required. One could be a consistent hedonist and hold that there are facts other 
than the amount of pleasure that help to determine the relative value of individual 
pleasures. For instance, shaftesbury seems to indicate that some pleasures lack 
value, given the fact that they are taken in objects that themselves have no value: 
“and for some low and sordid Pleasures of human Kind; shou’d they be ever so 
lastingly enjoy’d, and in the highest credit with their enjoyers; I shou’d never 
afford ’em the name of Happiness or Good.”30 Hutcheson, however, takes a more 
conservative stance. according to Hutcheson, “The Value of any Pleasure, and the 
29 Of course, this claim is controversial. according to Jonathan riley, for instance, “ethical hedo-
nism requires that any human capable of rational persuasion ought always to prefer more pleasure to 
less” (“Interpreting,” 415). However, this critique clearly relies on an assumption about the nature of 
hedonism, viz. that any hedonist value theory must accept that more pleasure is better than less. But 
there is no reason to accept this as a canonical account of the nature of hedonism. For the purposes 
of this paper, I identify hedonism simply with the view that all and only pleasure is a benefit. How 
pleasures are rank-ordered on this understanding of hedonism is an entirely open matter.
30 shaftesbury, Characteristicks, II.227. 
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Quantity or Moment of any Pain, is in a compounded Proportion of the Intenseness 
and Duration.”31 Though Hutcheson does, in fact, claim that “low and sordid” 
pleasures contain less enjoyment than the “higher” pleasures, he does seem to 
claim that the value of any pleasure just is its intensity and duration.32 shaftesbury 
disagrees. shaftesbury claims that even some very long-lasting and intense pleasures 
are not valuable at all.
I think we should read Hume as a qualitative hedonist. The first bit of evidence 
refers specifically to Hume’s declaration that the faculty of “taste, as it gives pleasure 
or pain . . . constitutes happiness or misery” (E app. 1, 21, 294). But note that the 
faculty of taste—and with it the pleasures that constitute this faculty—permits of 
an independent standard. according to Hume, “The great variety of Taste, as well 
as of opinion, which prevails in the world, is too obvious not to have fallen under 
every one’s observation” (ST 226).  Given this variation, however, Hume holds 
that “[i]t is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the various 
sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision, afforded, confirming 
one sentiment, and condemning another” (ST 229).
What constitutes the true standard of taste, for Hume? Of course, Hume 
could just say that the proper standard is the one that praises the good rather 
than the bad, and so forth. But this would require an account of good objects that 
is explanatorily prior to their vindication by sentiment, that is, the sentiments of 
pleasure that “gild and stain.” Hume explicitly rejects this arrow of explanation. 
according to Hume, however, we can achieve the “true standard” by honing our 
sentiments—in particular, rendering them more delicate, avoiding prejudice, 
engaging in comparison, and so on. “strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, 
improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can 
alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever 
they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty” (ST 241). What is so 
special about these characteristics? Though I will discuss this in more depth in §4, 
Hume holds that to possess sentiments that conform to the standard of taste aligns 
our sentiments with human nature. sentiments of pleasure that are out of practice, 
lack comparison, or are insufficiently delicate, and so forth, are “perverted” (ST 
241)—perverted away from the sentiments of human nature (ST 233–34, 243). 
Under such conditions, our faculty of taste does not operate adequately. (Note 
my use of the term ‘adequate.’ One might wonder why someone possessed of 
the true standard of taste should be interpreted as possessing an “adequately” 
operating faculty of taste, insofar as Hume clearly notes that the possession of the 
standard of taste requires honing and is a deviation from the norm. The answer is 
that ‘adequately’ is not meant to be read statistically. Hume very clearly believes 
that the standard of taste is the state in which our faculty of taste is in adequate 
operation; but that the most statistically common state is one in which our faculty 
of taste has degraded (ST 232); more on this in §4.33)
The importance of Hume’s discussion of the standard of taste for a first-order 
understanding of his hedonism is, I think, significant. If taste—the pleasures of 
31 Hutcheson, Essay, 87.
32 For a defense of this reading of Hutcheson, see Dorsey, “Deceptive.”
33 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer; see also note 50.
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which constitute happiness and misery—permits of a recognized standard, it 
seems natural to say that pleasure that fails to meet this standard is less valuable 
than pleasure that does. One could imagine, for instance, two critics, one of 
whom takes substantial pleasure in brilliant work by singer-sargent, the other in 
a typical “dogs-playing-poker” effort by C. M. Coolidge. However, the pleasure of 
the latter individual (who, or so it would appear, lacks the requisite delicacy, etc.) 
is deformed—it is the product of an inadequately operating faculty of taste. But if 
this is correct, it would seem entirely strange to say that the value of this pleasure 
is just the same as the value of the pleasure taken by the person whose sentiments 
reflect the true standard.
This, then, is the reading I propose: pleasures that conform to the true standard 
of taste are more valuable than those that do not. The axiological ordering of 
pleasures, then, goes beyond a mere consideration of the relative quantity: it is 
possible, for instance, for a short-duration pleasure that conforms to the standard of 
taste to be better, a more substantial contribution to welfare, than a long-duration 
pleasure that does not. a few notes regarding what my view does not entail. I do 
not believe that, on Hume’s account, “deformed” pleasures, that is, those that do 
not conform to the true standard of taste, lack value. (Hume’s attitude toward 
the lower pleasures is not shaftesbury’s.) For Hume, as is relatively clear from the 
Treatise, all pleasure maintains value: pleasure just is goodness, in other words. and 
hence it would be a decidedly uncharitable and ad hoc presumption to hold that, 
for Hume, only some pleasures are valuable, while others are not. all I mean to 
suggest is that Hume is a qualitative hedonist just in the classic sense, namely, that 
the quality of pleasures are to be evaluated not simply along two indices (intensity 
and duration), but rather three (intensity, duration, and conformity to the standard 
of taste). One method by which to evaluate a particular pleasure is to determine 
whether that pleasure conforms, or does not, to the standard of taste: whether 
this sentiment would be possessed by those whose taste is “delicate, improved by 
practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice.”34
a brief note before I argue for this reading. Hume declares that the pleasures of 
the faculty of taste constitute happiness or misery. But the term ‘constitute’ could be 
read in one of two ways, given Hume’s context. The first way to read this term would 
be to hold that all and only pleasures of the faculty of taste maintain welfare value: 
‘constitute’ means full constitution. This reading, however, is problematic. Insofar 
as the pleasures of the faculty of taste are taken in some particular object (such as 
wine, character traits, etc.), this would appear to rule out mere “bodily” pleasures 
or simple pleasurable sensations as playing any role in happiness and well-being. 
Furthermore, given Hume’s conceptual identification between pain and pleasure 
and good and evil, it would appear that to read ‘constitute’ as full constitution 
would entail a controversial view about Hume’s conception of pleasure, namely, 
34 Of course, this renders the axiological contribution of intensity and duration somewhat unique 
in comparison to quality, for Hume. The lack of intensity or duration does, in fact, entail that the 
relevant mental attitude (the would-be “pleasure”) lacks value. Not so for a pleasure of zero quality. 
But this is due simply to the fact that quality is not an existential condition on pleasure. One can have 
a pleasurable sentiment or sensation of zero quality. But one cannot have a pleasurable sensation or 
sentiment of zero intensity or zero duration. Hence this asymmetry is not incoherent or unmotivated.
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that there are no “mere” bodily pleasures.35 However, my reading of Hume’s 
first-order axiology does not depend on this reading. It is compatible with the 
arguments to come that ‘constitution’ might be read as partial constitution—the 
pleasures of the faculty of taste help to constitute happiness and misery, rather 
than fully constitute happiness and misery.36 That Hume assesses the quality of 
pleasures—even some limited range of pleasures—according to their quality as 
well as their intensity and duration is sufficient to establish that he is a qualitative 
hedonist. Indeed, as I shall go on to argue, Hume offers an important axiological 
explanation for the distinction between higher and lower pleasures of the faculty 
of taste that could, in principle, apply to any pleasure—even those bare bodily 
pleasures that do not appear to fall within the purview of the faculty of taste.
Without further ado, then, I present two arguments for the claim that the 
pleasures that conform to the true standard of taste are superior to those that 
diverge. 
3.1. First Argument: The Derivative Value of Good Objects 
as noted in §2.3, Hume insists that there is a particular relationship between the 
objects of value and the value-authoritative sentiments that determine their value. 
allow me to quote again this passage from “The sceptic”: “even when the mind 
operates alone, and feeling the sentiment of blame or approbation, pronounces 
one object deformed or odious, another beautiful and amiable; I say that, even 
in this case, those qualities are not really in the objects, but belong entirely to the 
sentiment of that mind which blames or praises.” Hume makes a similar claim in 
“Of the standard of Taste”: “It be certain, that beauty and deformity . . . are not 
qualities in objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment, internal or external” (ST 
235). as I noted above, the value of objects is derivative for Hume, derived from 
the value of the pleasures they cause. and hence any value possessed by individual 
objects must ultimately rest in the fundamental value of the pleasures one maintains 
upon contemplation. But then Hume cannot say that pleasure that arises from a 
consideration of “New year’s eve in Dogville” would be just as good as the pleasure 
one takes in “Portrait of Madame X.” The beauty of the latter outshines that of the 
former, and hence any value that is accorded to the pleasure taken in the former 
rather than the latter must be substantially diminished.37
35 Indeed, there is some evidence to believe that Hume accepted the existence of mere bodily 
pleasures. Hume holds that one of the fundamental impressions, along with “figure, bulk, motion, 
and solidity” and “colours, tastes, smells, sounds, heat and cold” is “pains and pleasures, that arise 
from the application of objects to our bodies, as by the cutting of our flesh with steel, and such like” 
(T 1.4.2.12, 192). Here Hume seems to be specifically referring to mere bodily pleasures, e.g. the 
pain that we feel as a response to physical bodily harm rather than upon contemplation of some object 
sufficient to “gild and stain.”
36 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer.
37 an anonymous reviewer rightly notes that Hume’s account of the standard of taste is explicitly 
concerned with the standard of aesthetic taste: what constitutes a “true judge” in matters of art, etc. But 
the argument of this section is neutral with regard to whether Hume believed that the standard of 
taste is limited to aesthetic matters or not. according to Hume, the value of good objects—even their 
mere aesthetic value—is explained by the value of the sentiments that approve of them. and hence 
this has a direct consequence for our understanding of Hume’s hedonism even if we read the standard 
of taste as applying only to aesthetic matters. But leaving this aside, it is clear that Hume’s standard of 
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let me put this point in a slightly different way. If the value found in objects is 
derivative of the value of sentiments that praise them, then Hume, on a quantitative 
reading, must be a relativist about the quality of objects. On a quantitative hedonism, 
Hume must say that objects that produce equal amounts of pleasure for observers 
are equal in value. This is just a result of treating the value of objects as derivative 
of the value of the sentiments they cause and holding that the value of pleasurable 
sentiments is determined by their intensity and duration. But, as is surely correct, 
“Portrait of Madame X” and “New years eve in Dogville” can generate the same 
amount of pleasure depending on one’s taste. and hence for Hume, there would 
be no ground for condemning the individual who praised Coolidge over singer-
sargent so long as that person was doing so honestly, that is, genuinely took more 
pleasure in the former. But Hume explicitly denies any relativism of good objects 
and is perfectly willing to engage in such condemnation: “Whoever would assert 
an equality of genius and elegance between Ogilby and Milton, or Bunyan and 
addison, would be thought to defend no less an extravagance, than if he had 
maintained a mole-hill to be as high as Teneriffe, or a pond as extensive as the 
ocean. Though there may be found persons, who give the preference to the former 
authors; no one pays attention to such a taste; and we pronounce without scruple 
the sentiment of these pretended critics to be absurd and ridiculous” (ST 230–31; 
see also ST 229). Here Hume makes no exception for those who take more pleasure 
in Ogilby than Milton: anyone who defends an equality of “genius and elegance” 
between them is incorrect. Thus for Hume there is no relativism of good objects. 
and hence the pleasures that constitute the true standard of taste must be more 
valuable; only this could explain the consistently superior value of singer-sargent 
to Coolidge given that both such objects can generate equal amounts of pleasure 
and given that the differential value of such objects must be explained by the 
differential value of the pleasurable sentiments to which they give rise.
The argument provided above has gone down a number of tangents, and tied 
together a number of different aspects of Hume’s work. and so I think it would be 
helpful to frame it schematically, just to be more explicit how the parts interrelate: 
1.  The value of objects is derivative of the value of the pleasure they cause. (“The 
sceptic,” 163; ST 235)
2.  If Hume is a quantitative hedonist, then (by [1]) the value of objects is derivative 
of the amount of pleasure they cause.
3.  But the value of objects is not derivative of the amount of pleasure they cause. 
(ST 229–30)
4.  Hence (by [2] and [3]) Hume is not a quantitative hedonist.
Furthermore,
5.  Good objects are praised by sentiments constituting an adequately functioning 
faculty of taste. (ST passim)
6.  Hence (by [1] and [5]) the value of pleasures that constitute an adequately 
functioning faculty of taste are more valuable than those that do not. 
taste is meant to apply to every dimension of evaluative assessment. Hume also makes reference to a 
“standard” of taste in E app. 1. 21, in which he declares that the faculty of taste “gives the sentiment 
of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue.” Furthermore, in “Delicacy,” Hume refers to “that higher 
and more refined taste, which enables us to judge the characters of men, of compositions of genius, 
and of the productions of the nobler arts” (“Delicacy,” 6). (This feature of the standard of taste will 
become more relevant in §5.)
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3.2. Second Argument: The Prudential Value of Virtue 
In “The sceptic,” Hume suggests that 
the happiest disposition of mind is the virtuous: or, in other words, that which leads 
to action and employment, renders us sensible to the social passions, steels the heart 
against the assaults of fortune, reduces the affections to a just moderation, makes 
our own thoughts an entertainment to us, and inclines us rather to the pleasures of 
society and conversation, than to those of the senses. (“The sceptic,” 168)38
Hume notes a variety of benefits brought by virtue. Not only does it “steel the heart 
against the assaults of fortune,” but it also “inclines us” to “the pleasures of society 
and conversation” rather than to those of the senses (such as pleasure taken from 
“low and sensual objects”).39
One might be inclined to believe that Hume’s latter claim is direct evidence of 
a form of qualitative hedonism. Why else might he believe that we are better-off 
with the pleasures of society rather than, for example, the baser pleasures of the 
senses? and while I think this is the right spin to put on things, nothing comes so 
easy. Prior to this passage, Hume notes that the pursuit of the sensorial pleasures 
is “much more subject to satiety and disgust.”40 and hence one might think that 
the prudential benefits of virtue might be read in a more straightforward, and 
quantitative-hedonism-friendly, way: being inclined to the pleasures of the senses, 
though they are no less valuable in themselves, tends to generate far less pleasure 
overall, insofar as sensorial pleasures are subject to the aforementioned handicaps.
But Hume goes further than this. Immediately following his insistence that 
virtue is prudentially valuable, Hume considers someone who is insensible to (read: 
does not take pleasure in) virtue: 
On the other hand, where one is born of so perverse a frame of mind, of so callous 
and insensible a disposition, as to have no relish for virtue and humanity, no sympathy 
with his fellow-creatures, no desire of esteem and applause; such a one must be allowed 
entirely incurable, nor is there any remedy in philosophy. He reaps no satisfaction 
but from low and sensual objects, or from the indulgence of malignant passions. . . .  
He has not even that sense or taste, which is requisite to make him desire a better 
character: For my part, I know not how I should address myself to such a one, or by 
what arguments I should endeavor to reform him. should I tell him of the inward 
satisfaction which results from laudable and humane actions, the delicate pleasure 
of disinterested love and friendship, the lasting enjoyments of a good name and an 
established character, he might still reply, that these were, perhaps, pleasures to such 
as were susceptible of them; but that, for his part, he finds himself of a quite different 
turn and disposition. (“The sceptic,” 169–70)
In this passage, Hume considers someone who appears insensible of the social 
passions, that is, someone who does not take pleasure in “esteem and applause” 
or the other features that generally accompany the possession of virtue. rather, 
his pleasure is in “low and sensual objects” or “malignant” passions. For Hume, 
the difference between the lover of virtue and this unfortunate character is a 
38 Note that the prudential value of virtue, for Hume, is echoed in E 9; see §5.
39 Hume, “The sceptic,” 169.
40 Hume, “The sceptic,” 167.
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difference in taste: the latter is not “susceptible” to the pleasures of an established 
character, love and friendship, and so forth. He is “of a quite different turn and 
disposition.” This passage seems to clearly indicate a form of qualitative hedonism: 
the pleasures of love and friendship, and so forth, are simply better than the “low,” 
“sensual,” and “malignant” pleasures.
Presented with the character above, were Hume a quantitative hedonist, we 
should have expected one of two things. We should expect him to back down from 
his previous claim, namely, that virtue is in fact a prudential benefit to all. and 
while there may be some reason to believe that his insistence on the prudential 
value of virtue permits of exceptions (he refers to his claim that “the happiest 
disposition of mind is the virtuous” as the result of a “short and imperfect sketch of 
human life”),41 he does not apply this caution to the individual under discussion. 
Indeed, he not only does not take back his insistence on the prudential value of 
virtue, but also claims that those insensitive to virtue are unhappy: “I must repeat 
it; my philosophy affords no remedy in such a case, nor could I do any thing but 
lament this person’s unhappy condition.”42
alternatively, Hume might have said that the person in question is “unhappy” 
compared to the virtuous person, but that this is because the “unhappy” person 
simply takes less pleasure than those who have a taste for the pleasures of virtue. 
(after all, the pleasures experienced by this person are subject to “satiety and 
disgust.”) But this explanation—though perfectly natural—does not fit the text. 
Hume allows that the person in question takes plenty of pleasure (in “low and 
sensual objects”), and does not feel “remorse to control his vicious inclinations.”43 
Hence the general mechanisms that render the “low” pleasures subject to “satiety 
and disgust” are, at least in this case, not operative! (This fits with Hume’s 
description of his own psychological claims—including those regarding the low 
and sensual pleasures—as “imperfect” and “general.”44) and hence it would be 
implausible to read Hume as claiming that the unhappiness of the individual under 
description is a result of less pleasure. Given the weight of the evidence, then, his 
insistence on the prudential value of virtue is best read as a result of a qualitative, 
rather than quantitative, hedonist axiology. 
3.3. A New Question 
That Hume’s hedonism is objective rather than subjective gave rise to a question 
about its first-order structure: it seems plausible to say that Hume is a qualitative 
hedonist rather than a more straightforward quantitative hedonist. However, to 
say that Hume is a qualitative hedonist rather than a quantitative hedonist gives 
rise to yet a third question: what explains the value of the “higher” pleasures, or the 
pleasures that conform to the standard of taste? Why should those pleasures be 
better? This question is important. Because Hume relies on a qualitative hedonism 
to help explain the prudential value of virtue, it is important to avoid the suggestion 
41 Hume, “The sceptic,” 167.
42 Hume, “The sceptic,” 170.
43 Hume, “The sceptic,” 169.
44 Hume, “The sceptic,” 167.
262 journal  of  the  h istory  o f  phi lo so phy  53 :2  Apr i l  2015
that Hume’s qualitative hedonism is strictly ad hoc. and hence we should ask of 
Hume whether there is any independent explanation of the evaluative distinction 
between the higher and lower pleasures.
Indeed, the insistence on a consistent explanatory principle of the relative value 
of higher pleasures is a traditional stumbling block for qualitative hedonism. a 
lack of any clear explanation of the prudential value of the higher pleasures has 
dogged John stuart Mill’s own version.45 Indeed, Mill himself seems to punt on 
this question, referring only cryptically to a “sense of dignity.”46 In contrast, I claim 
that Hume is not only a qualitative hedonist, but offers a principled and (dare 
I say) plausible explanation of the relative value of higher and lower pleasures. 
4 .  h u m e ’ s  h e d o n i s m  a n d  h u m a n  n a t u r e
Hume’s hedonism divides higher and lower pleasures by the extent to which 
those pleasures conform to the true standard of taste. But if this is correct, an 
explanation of the value of higher pleasures in comparison to the lower pleasures 
is, for Hume, tantamount to asking about authority of the standard of taste itself. 
In other words, what explains the significance or superiority of a faculty of taste 
that lacks prejudice, maintains delicacy, practice, and comparison? Once we 
have explained the authority of the standard of taste as Hume construes it, we 
will have an explanation of the relative value of the pleasures that conform to that 
standard. One clue, however, is given in the second Enquiry. Here Hume writes 
that the standard of taste, as opposed to the standard of reason, “arising from the 
internal frame and constitution of animals, is ultimately derived from that supreme 
Will, which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and arranged the several 
classes and orders of existence” (E app. 1.21, 278). For Hume, the standard of 
taste—at least for humans—is an aspect of their internal frame and constitution, 
their nature. Hume writes, 
It appears then, that, amidst all the variety and caprice of taste, there are certain 
general principles of approbation or blame, whose influence a careful eye may trace 
in all operations of the mind. some particular forms or qualities, from the original 
structure of the internal fabric, are calculated to please, and others to displease; and 
if they fail of their effect in any particular instance, it is from some apparent defect 
or imperfection in the organ. a man in a fever would not insist on his palate as able to 
decide concerning flavours; nor would one, affected with the jaundice, pretend to 
give a verdict with regard to colours. In each creature, there is a sound and a defective 
state; and the former alone can be supposed to afford us a true standard of taste and 
sentiment. (ST 233–34; my emphasis) 
Here Hume appears to claim that the true standard of taste can only proceed from 
a sound state of one’s sentiments. But, for Hume, the sound state of a faculty of 
taste, from which the standard of this faculty is derived, is the state commensurate 
with human nature: “The general principles of taste are uniform in human nature: 
Where men vary in their judgments, some defect or perversion in the faculties 
may commonly be remarked; proceeding either from prejudice, from want of 
45 Cf. albee, History, 252; sidgwick, Outlines, 247.
46 Cf. Mill, Utilitarianism, II.6. For a reading of Mill on this question, see Dorsey, “authority.”
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practice, or want of delicacy; and there is just reason for approving one taste, and 
condemning another” (ST 243; see also ST 232).47
One might believe that Hume’s reference to human nature is a simple report 
of contingent, sociological fact, namely, that it just so happens (happily!) that 
the true standard of taste is common or uniform.48 However, this reading fails 
on two fronts. First, on this reading, the claim that the “principles of taste” are 
part of human nature reduces to the claim that most display these principles. But 
Hume believes that the relevant defects are common, and hence that individuals 
who possess the true standard of taste in perfect fashion are rare (ST 232, 241). 
Thus to read Hume’s link between the standard of taste and human nature as a 
claim about its sociological uniformity is explicitly ruled out.49 In addition, and 
more importantly, Hume believes that the reason we trust a given faculty is because 
it is not perverted or deformed away from human nature. Thus the fact that a 
particular sentiment conforms to human nature is reason to grant it evaluative 
authority. as confirmation of this reading, Hume accepts that in cases in which 
human nature does not generate only one particular sentimental reaction (“where 
there is such a diversity in the internal frame or external situation as is entirely 
blameless on both sides”) there can be no standard of taste: “We seek in vain for 
a standard, by which we can reconcile the contrary sentiments” (ST 244). and 
hence, or so it would seem, the authority of the particular standard Hume picks 
out is explained by the fact of its correspondence with human nature; Hume’s 
reference to human nature is therefore not merely sociological, but explains the 
trustworthiness, and hence superior value, of the sentiments of those whose taste 
conforms to the standard.
For Hume, the explanation of the comparative value of “higher” pleasures 
draws parallels with the theory of welfare sometimes known as “perfectionism.” 
Perfectionism about welfare or prudential value holds that a person’s life goes 
better to the extent that she develops or “perfects” the capacities inherent in 
human nature.50 Of course, “human nature” is a fraught philosophical concept; 
it smacks of certain forms of aristotelian teleology, as well as a reference, say, to 
humankind’s rationality. Indeed, perfectionism as a view has generally identified 
humanity’s rational capacities as the central evaluative feature of human nature.51 
But this is not essential to perfectionism; the perfectionist is free to select those 
features of human nature that are most essential to value. and it is clear that, 
for Hume, the most valuable pleasures are those that proceed from a perfection 
47 see also Jones, “Texts,” 440.
48 see Townsend, Hume’s Aesthetic Theory, 194.
49 an anonymous reviewer notes that it may be incongruous to say that the standard of taste 
requires extraordinary care and cultivation and, in the same breath, to say that lacking such taste is 
somehow deformed rather than merely lacking this extraordinary care. But this is not incongruous. 
as Hume writes, “Those finer emotions of the mind are of a very tender and delicate nature, and 
require the concurrence of many favourable circumstances to make them play with facility and exact-
ness, according to their general and established principles. The least exterior hinderance to such 
small springs, or the least internal disorder, disturbs their motion, and confounds the operation of 
the whole machine” (ST 232).
50 Cf. Hurka, Perfectionism, ch. 1; Dorsey, “Three arguments.”
51 Cf. Hurka, Perfectionism, ch. 2; Brink, “significance.”
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(sound operation) of humanity’s sentimental nature: the sentiments that would 
occur for humans would be their sentiments in a “sound” rather than “defective” 
state. Putting this all together, one might respond to the question posed in this 
section in the following way: the normative significance of the “higher” pleasures, 
for Hume, is explained by the fact that higher pleasures just are those sentiments 
that characterize the perfection or sound operation of humanity’s sentimental 
nature. Other pleasures, such as a relish for the “low and sensual objects or from 
the indulgence of malignant passions,” are defects or perversions and are worth 
less because of it.
That human nature should play an important role in Hume’s axiological theory 
should come as no surprise. It plays a similar role in Hume’s moral theory. For 
instance, Hume writes that “no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless 
there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of 
its morality” (T 3.2.1.7, 479). Hume’s “undoubted maxim” grants a role not just 
to our motivations, but rather the motivations found in human nature, and hence 
grants human nature in particular a role in determining the applicability of virtue 
to particular actions. so it would be unsurprising for Hume to hold that human 
nature also plays a role in determining the value of individual pleasures. Of course, 
this argument is not a knock-down. But to say that Hume treats the pleasures 
experienced by an adequately functioning faculty of taste as more valuable because 
those pleasures exhibit a particular property (i.e. being the pleasures of human 
nature) explains the axiological distinction between Hume’s higher and lower 
pleasures, and comports with Hume’s treatment of the significance of human 
nature in his wider moral theory.
One might object to this reading on the following grounds. To hold that Hume 
accepted a hybrid of hedonism and perfectionism treats Hume as accepting an 
unstable philosophical position.52 after all, if human nature itself is valuable, why 
believe that it is simply pleasures that conform to or are fitting of human nature 
that are more valuable? Why not believe, say, that activities, or styles of life, or 
exercises of capacities that are also fitting of human nature (such as the capacity 
for rationality, etc.) are themselves valuable? after all, such things can all display, 
or fail to display, consonance with human nature.
I have two responses to this question. The first is that my reading of Hume’s 
view does not interpret “conformity to human nature” as itself valuable, any more 
than it interprets “intensity” or “duration” as valuable. rather, conformity to human 
nature is a property of individual pleasures that renders that pleasure better or 
worse; it is a method by which to rank-order pleasures, just as, other things being 
equal, more intense pleasures are more valuable, and longer-lasting pleasures 
are more valuable. admittedly, intensity and duration are methods by which to 
measure the quantity of a pleasure; conformity to human nature is not (see note 
35). But there is no reason that a qualitative hedonist of the form I am attributing 
to Hume would have to admit that non-pleasures that conform to human nature 
are valuable any more than they would have to admit that intense and long-lasting 
non-pleasures are valuable.
52 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
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second, however, even if the current position is philosophically unstable, there 
is sufficient evidence to believe that it is, in fact, Hume’s view. Hume commits 
himself to a conceptual form of hedonism: the good just is pleasure, in other 
words. and hence it would be false to say that non-pleasures could be good, non-
pains evil. But there is also very good evidence to say that Hume believes that not 
all pleasures are to be rank-ordered given their quantity, for the reasons already 
offered. The pleasures of an adequately functioning faculty of taste (which are 
themselves identified as pleasures inherent in human nature) are clearly more 
valuable than those of a “deformed” taste—only this reading can explain the 
existence of a standard of taste at all.
as a final note in this section, recall that there was some question of whether, 
for Hume, happiness was fully, or only partially, constituted by the pleasures of 
the faculty of taste. and while it is clear that the pleasures of taste come in higher 
and lower varieties, if it is the case that conformity to human nature explains 
the pleasures of an adequately operating faculty of taste, then there is no barrier 
to applying this particular axiological principle to pleasures that may not fall 
within the faculty of taste, such as bare sensory or bodily pleasures. I leave aside 
consideration of whether such bare bodily pleasures will display a difference in 
conformity to human nature; I merely note that Hume’s qualitative hedonism need 
not be read to apply only to pleasures of the faculty of taste. On Hume’s view, any 
distinction, among any set of pleasures, in their conformity to human nature can 
in principle be relevant to their quality. 
5 .  t h e  s e n s i b l e  k n a v e  i n  
l i g h t  o f  h u m e ’ s  q u a l i t a t i v e  h e d o n i s m
I have so far argued that Hume is a hedonist of extraordinary sophistication. Not 
only is he a qualitative hedonist, but his hedonism is intriguingly blended with 
elements of a perfectionist value theory. In addition to contributing directly to 
our understanding of his moral philosophy, however, reading Hume’s hedonism 
in this way pays substantial dividends when it comes to Hume’s treatment of the 
virtue of justice.
as noted before, Hume devotes the second part of the ninth book of the Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals to the question of “our interested obligation” to 
virtue, that is, “whether every man, who has any regard to his own happiness 
and welfare, will not best find his account in the practice of every moral duty” (E 
9.2.14, 278). according to Hume, “The peculiar advantage of” his account of the 
nature of the virtues “seems to be, that it furnishes the proper mediums for that 
purpose” (E 9.2.16, 280). so Hume appears to say that, in fact, virtuous behavior 
is in the interest of everyone. and while Hume thinks it is easy to show that this 
fact holds for most of the virtues, we hit a snag when it comes to justice: “Treating 
vice with the greatest candour, and making it all possible concessions, we must 
acknowledge, that there is not, in any instance, the smallest pretext for giving it 
the preference above virtue, with a view to self-interest; except, perhaps, in the 
case of justice, where a man, taking things in a certain light, may often seem to 
be a loser by his integrity” (E 9.2.22, 282). The puzzle, then, would be that this 
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person (viz. the apparent loser by integrity) appears not to have any interested 
obligation to virtue; Hume has failed in his own stated goals.
Hume’s discussion of the sensible knave, namely, a person who holds that “honesty 
is the best policy” but that the prudential value of virtue is nevertheless “liable to 
many exceptions,” has been the subject of exhaustive comment. readings of the 
knave typically fall into one of two camps. The first camp suggests that Hume 
believes that justice is not, in fact, in the interest of the knave: the sensible knave’s 
assessment of his own prudential interests is accurate. For instance, David Gauthier 
claims that the sensible knave shows that Hume’s account of the virtue of justice 
is an “error theory.” “The sensible knave’s message is that human society, which 
depends on the [disposition to be just], lacks any moral foundation.”53 a crucial 
step in defense of Gauthier’s reading is his claim that “Hume does not accuse 
the sensible knave of mistaking his interest.”54 Making reference to the knave, 
stephen Darwall writes that “[b]y the time he wrote the Enquiry . . . Hume was 
no longer prepared to say that justice is invariably advantageous.”55 according to 
annette Baier, “From the knave’s point of view, and given her psychology, it may 
be prudent to continue with knavery.”56 For Jason Baldwin, the sensible knave is 
just an exception to the general rule that virtue is prudentially valuable.57 This 
general reading is in part motivated by Hume’s confessed inability to provide any 
adequate response to the knave: “I must confess, that, if a man think, that this 
reasoning much requires an answer, it will be a little difficult to find any, which 
will to him appear satisfactory and convincing. If his heart rebel not against such 
pernicious maxims, if he feel no reluctance to the thoughts of villainy or baseness, 
he has indeed lost a considerable motive to virtue; and we may expect, that his 
practice will be answerable to his speculation” (E 9.2.23).
The second camp reads Hume as insisting that the sensible knave does mistake 
his own prudential interests. Gerald Postema claims that the sensible knave has a 
perfectly good prudential motivation to conform to justice, given a disposition to 
take pleasure in the esteem of himself and others.58 Christine Korsgaard’s view is 
similar: “[T]he fact that other people will disapprove and dislike the sensible knave 
will be sufficient to provide him with feelings of disapproval and dislike of himself. 
Of course a knave will try to keep his knavish actions secret. But unless he is very 
hardened indeed, even the knowledge that others would hate him if they knew 
what he is up to will be enough to produce humility and self-hatred when he acts 
unjustly.”59
Neither reading fully captures Hume’s text in the crucial section of the Enquiry. 
To claim that the sensible knave does not act imprudently in carrying out his 
knavish strategy is inconsistent with Hume’s refusal to retreat from his claim that 
virtue is in the interest of the virtuous. Hume explicitly claims that his own system 
53 Gauthier, “artificial,” 422.
54 Gauthier, “artificial,” 417.
55 Darwall, Internal, 309.
56 Baier, “response,” 431.
57 Baldwin, “Interests,” 291–96. 
58 Postema, “Knave,” 23–40. 
59 Korsgaard, Sources, 59.
267objectiv ity  &  perfecti o n  i n  hu me’s  hed o n i sm
can show that “every man” will best advance his own happiness and welfare by 
conforming to virtue (E 9.2.16, 280). (and hence his own stated argumentative 
goal can seem to permit of no exception to be made in the case of the knave.) 
second, Hume appears to deny that the knave is, in fact, motivated by “the esteem 
of himself and others.” as Hume notes, the sensible knave’s heart “rebels not” at 
“thoughts of villany or baseness.” (and hence, or so it would seem, Hume does 
conceive the knave as “very hardened indeed,” in Korsgaard’s phrase.)
If Hume is a qualitative hedonist, however, we have the power to read his 
discussion of the sensible knave in a way that simply and straightforwardly vindicates 
his main conclusion.60 Take the final paragraph of E 9: 
But were [the sensible knave] ever so secret and successful, the honest man, if he has 
any tincture of philosophy, or even common observation and reflection, will discover 
that they themselves are, in the end, the greatest dupes, and have sacrificed the 
invaluable enjoyment of a character, with themselves at least, for the acquisition of 
worthless toys and gewgaws. How little is requisite to supply the necessities of nature? 
and in a view to pleasure, what comparison between the unbought satisfaction of 
conversation, society, study, even health and the beauties of nature, but above all 
the peaceful reflection on one’s own conduct: What comparison, I say, between 
these, and the feverish, empty amusements of luxury and expense? These natural 
pleasures, indeed, are really without price; both because they are below all price in 
their attainment, and above it in their enjoyment. (E 9.2.25, 283–84) 
Here Hume describes the sensible knave as “the greatest dupe.” In providing 
a reason for this conclusion, he notes the distinction between the “invaluable 
enjoyment of a character” and the “empty amusements of luxury and expense.” 
This should sound familiar. Hume is indicting the sensible knave not for being a 
faulty reasoner or for failing to grasp his own motivations, but for failing to possess 
the proper taste. according to Hume, however successful the sensible knave is at 
procuring these “empty amusements,” the sensible knave will not be successful at 
procuring a better life as compared to the life of virtue. Why? Because the pleasures 
of virtue are more valuable; a person who maintains delicacy, discernment, a lack 
of prejudice, and so forth—in other words, the honest man61—will enjoy character 
more than the pleasures of “worthless toys and gewgaws.”62 Note what Hume does 
not say. He does not attempt to claim that there is more pleasure to be had in the 
life of the honest man, or those that engage the “natural pleasures.” and though 
he states that the favored pleasures are “above” the amusements of luxury and 
expense “in their enjoyment,” this should not be read to indicate that the honest 
man takes more pleasure (which, given the psychological makeup of the sensible 
knave, Hume explicitly rejects). rather, the honest man takes better pleasure than 
the knave does in his “feverish” pursuits.
If we read Hume like this, we can explain his conviction that every man, even 
the knave, maintains an interested obligation to virtue. Though the knave may take 
60 The following argument is foreshadowed in Dorsey, “Internalism,” 16–19. 
61 To claim that the “honest man” possesses the proper taste is supported by Hume’s suggestion 
that the standard of taste is essential for proper moral judgment and motivation; see note 38.
62 Worth noting in this connection is that Hume explicitly states that an honest man will seem to 
be a loser by his integrity. Hume spends the rest of this section arguing that, in fact, this is a mere 
seeming: the sensible knave maintains pleasures that are worth less.
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less pleasure in virtue than in the pursuit of fortune, and so forth, the pleasure 
he takes in virtue is “finer” (ST 236) than the pleasure he takes in collecting his 
tchotchkes. Of course, Hume is unable to address himself directly to the sensible 
knave, because no reasoning will convince the sensible knave that the honest man’s 
pleasures are more valuable. Indeed, why should it? What must be addressed in 
the sensible knave is not his faulty reasoning but rather his faulty taste. and insofar 
as one cannot reason one’s way to an adequately operating faculty of taste (ST 231) 
one cannot, presumably, convince the sensible knave to alter his pursuit other than 
by altering his taste (by, for instance, practice, delicacy, lack of prejudice, etc.). 
Thus it would appear that Hume’s perfectionist hedonism helps us understand his 
treatment of the sensible knave, and his general claim that virtue is a benefit, and 
vice a burden (even if the vicious are of a “quite different turn and disposition”).63
Hume’s treatment of the sensible knave is, if we read Hume as accepting a form 
of qualitative hedonism, utterly unmysterious. For this reason, Hume’s discussion of 
the sensible knave supports my reading of his hedonism. To sum up, then, Hume’s 
hedonism is, first, objective: he holds that pleasure and pain are identical to good 
and evil, and this is independent of any preference or pro-attitude. second, Hume’s 
hedonism is qualitative. He holds that pleasures that constitute an adequately 
operating faculty of taste are better than pleasures taken by a poorly functioning 
faculty of taste, or a faculty that is not practiced, delicate, and so forth. Third, the 
proper explanation of Hume’s axiological distinction between higher and lower 
pleasures appeals to the evaluative authority of humanity’s sentimental nature. To 
accept this view is to straightforwardly account for Hume’s stated argumentative 
goals in E 9 as well as his inability to directly address the sensible knave. This is 
enough, I think, to entitle my reading very serious consideration. 
6 .  c o n c l u s i o n
In light of the argument of this paper, two points are, I think, worth reflection. 
First, one feature of my reading of Hume may give some pause. I have generally 
treated Hume’s writings throughout his career, including the Treatise (1739), the 
second Enquiry (1751), and the Essays (1741; “Of the standard of Taste,” 1757), 
as expressing a coherent account of the welfare value of pleasure. But some may 
plausibly object that Hume’s hedonism as expressed in the Treatise, for instance, 
63 There is perhaps one method of reading Hume’s treatment of the sensible knave that is com-
patible with a quantitative rather than qualitative hedonism. This reading holds that, on Hume’s view, 
those without the taste for the social pleasures—though they experience plenty of low “amusements”—
will, when their taste is refined, take more pleasure in the pleasures of virtue than they do in the lower 
pleasures, as a simple matter of psychological fact. This would explain Hume’s inability to convince 
the knave: the knave, given his poor taste, is insensible to, or at the very least takes less pleasure in, 
virtue. But once his taste is refined, more pleasure is available to the knave in the practice of virtue. But 
this reading has two problems. First, and most importantly, it cannot explain why the knave, given his 
psychology, would be better-off experiencing less pleasure (the pleasures of virtue) than more (the 
pleasures of toys and gewgaws), even though, with a more refined taste, more pleasure would be 
available via a noble character. and hence this reading would be unable to deliver Hume’s claim that 
“every man” is better-off being virtuous. second, and somewhat less clear-cut, Hume refrains from 
using explicitly quantitative terms to discuss the pleasures of a refined taste, preferring instead terms 
such as “finest” or “most innocent” (ST 236–37).
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cannot sensibly be read as containing anything like the qualitative features of 
his hedonism as expressed in the second Enquiry, or his later Essays. I have some 
sympathy for this line of critique. Nevertheless, it seems to me preferable to read 
Hume as maintaining a coherent view if possible, and, in addition, there is nothing 
in the Treatise itself that tells in favor of or against a qualitative interpretation of 
his work. (although, to be fair, evidence for the normative force of human nature 
itself—which, on my reading, helps to explain the axiological significance of 
Hume’s “higher” pleasures—can be found in the Treatise [T 3.2.1.7, 479].) and 
hence, or so I claim, there is good reason to read Hume’s hedonism as consistent, 
but of course I cannot rule out the suggestion that this qualitative hedonism in 
particular is a distinctive feature of his late, or at least comparatively late, thought.
second, there are a number of questions that might still arise when thinking 
about Hume’s hedonism. In particular, one might ask about the metaphysical 
nature of pleasure as Hume conceives it.64 (I have noted that Hume uses the term 
‘pleasure’ to refer to a diverse set of feelings and sentiments that differ radically, 
but there remain important questions on this front.) In addition, there are first-
order questions: how much more are the “higher” pleasures worth? should we be 
willing to trade any amount of the lower pleasures for the higher? (admittedly, 
it is difficult to maintain Hume’s confidence in the prudential value of virtue as 
compared to vice unless one is also willing to grant very heavy axiological weight 
to the “higher” as opposed to “lower” pleasures. But much more should be said to 
come up with anything like a full picture of the axiological relationship between 
these pleasures, for Hume.)
leaving these further questions aside, however, I think that on balance we 
should read in Hume not just a form of hedonism about happiness or welfare, 
but a sophisticated and pathbreaking form of qualitative hedonism. Hume not 
only offers an axiological distinction between higher and lower pleasures, but 
also helpfully explains this distinction in terms of their relative conformity to the 
pleasures inherent in human nature. The emerging “perfectionist hedonism” is 
not just significant for our growing understanding of Hume’s moral theory, but 
is a legitimate view worth taking seriously in its own right.65
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